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Labor relations involve incentive problems. The market solves
these problems by developing a variety of institutions. Thispaper





Chicago, Ui 60637Incentives are the essence of economics. The most basic concept, demand,
considers how to induce a consumer to buy more of a particular good, i.e., how
to give him an incentive to purchase. Similarly, supply relationships are
descriptions of how agents respond with more output or labor to additional
compensation.
Incentive contracts arise because individual love leisure. In order to
induce them to forgo some leisure, or put alternatively, to put fortheffort,
some form of compensation must be offered. The theme of the essay is that
different forms of incentive contracts deal with some aspects of theproblems
better than others. The strength of' one type of contract is the weakness of
another. The labor market trades off these strengths and weaknesses and
thereby selects a set of institutions. In what follows, the development of
the literature on incentive contracts is briefly discussed. Theemphasis is
on concepts, rather than specific papers or authors, so thebibliography is
far from exhaustive.
To discuss incentive contracts, the most generalconcepts must be
narrowed. This essay does that in two ways: First, attention here is
restricted to the labor market. At a more general level, incentive contracts
can relate to other areas as well. For example, the governmentmay want to
have a space satellite built at the lowest possible cost. To doso,
incentives must be set appropriately or the producermay charge too much or
fail to meet desired quality standards. This problem isanalogous to those
that arise in the labor context, but for the most part,they are ignored,
except when isomorphic with the labor market paradigm. Similarly, the law and
economics literature is another area where incentive problemsare studied,
usually in the context of accident liability. (See, for example, Green
(1976), Shavefl (1980), Polinsky (1981).) These specificquestions are—3—
ignored as well, except as they border on the labor market context. Second,
the focus is on observability problems. Standard labor supply functions,
where hours of work can be observed and paid, are incentive contracts.
However, standard labor supply issues are eliminated from consideration since
they are dealt with in other essays in the New Palgrave.
I. General FrameWork
An employer in a competitive environment must induce a worker to perform
at the efficient level of effort or face extinction. The reason is simple: If
one employer can, through clever use of an incentive contract, get a worker to
perform at a more efficient level, that firm's cost will be lower. Lower
costs imply that higher wages can be paid to workers and all workers will be
stolen from inefficient firms. As a result, the objective function that is
taken as standard for the firm is:
Max F(Q; E) —C(S), (1)
F
where Q is output and E is worker effort. Thus, F(Q; E) is thecompen-
sation schedule that the firm announces to the worker; C(S) is the worker's
cost of effort function, to be thought of as the dollar cost associated with
supplying effort level E.
The competitive nature of the firm in factor and product markets implies
that the firm must maximize worker net wealth as in (1) subject to thezero
profit constraint:
QrF(Q;5) . (2)
Output is defined so that each unit sells for one dollar (the numeraire).
Thus, (2) merely says that output, Q, must be paid entirely to the worker
otherwise another firm could steal the worker away by paying more.The incentive problem arises because the worker takes the compensation
scheme F(Q; F) as given and chooses effort to maximize expected utility.
Once the worker has accepted the Job, his problem is:
Max F(Q; E) —C(E) (3)
F
The worker's effort supply function comes from solving the first—order
condition associated with (3) or
C'(E) r +' (U)
which says that the worker sets the marginal cost of effort equal to its
marginal return to him. The transformation of output into effort, i.e.,
Q/aE, depends on the production function. A convenient specification is
(5)
so that output is the sum of effort, E, and luck, v.
An incentive contract selects F(Q; E) subject to the zero profit
constraint, (2), taking into account that the worker behaves according to (4).
There are an infinite variety of incentive contracts that are subsumed by
F(Q; F). To make things clear, we consider two polar extremes—-the salary and
the piece rate.1
Let us define a salary as compensation that depends only on input so that
F(Q; F) takes the form S(E). An hourly wage is an example. Irrespective of
the amount that is produced during the hour, the worker receives a fixed
amount that depends only on the fact that he supplies F of effort for the
hour. (Of course, difficulty in measuring F may be a compelling reason to
1An elaboration of some of the pcints contained hereincan be found in
Lazear (1986a).-5—
avoid this form of incentive contract.) At the other extreme is a piece rate
where compensation depends only on output so that F(Q; E) takes the form of
R(Q). There, no matter how much or how little effort the worker exerts, his
compensation depends only on the number of units produced. Both salaries and
piece rates are incentive contracts; the first provides incentives by paying
workers on the basis of input. The second provides incentives by paying on
the basis of output. More sophisticated incentive contracts, which blend the
two or use multiperiod approaches are discussed later.
II. The Principal—Agent Problem
At the center of the incentive contract literature is the "principal-
agent" problem. The principal, say, an employer, wants to induce its agent,
say, a worker, to behave in a way that is beneficial to the employer. The
problem is that the principal's knowledge is imperfect; either he cannot see
what the agent does (as in the case of a taxi driver who can sleep on the job)
or he cannot interpret the actions (as in the case of an auto mechanic who
replaces a number of parts to correct a perhaps simple malfunction). The
incentive contracts that can be used to address the problem were discussed
early by Ross (1972), Mirrlees (1976), Calvo and Wellisz (1978), and by Becker
and Stigler (197L). The last in particular, uses a sampling approach. For
example, a politician can be required to post a large bond on taking office.
If he is caught engaging in some malfeasant behavior, he forfeits the bond.
This contract is based on output, which is observed infrequently or
imperfectly. Other kinds of incentive contracts are discussed in the
following sections.—6—
III. Payment by Output
A. Sharecropping
One of the earliest examples of incentive contracts that is based on
output is sharecropping. In sharecropping, the owner contracts to split the
output of' the land in some proportion with the individual who farms and lives
on it.It was also one of the first incentive schemes that was clearly
analyzed (see Johnson, 1950 and later Cheung, 1968 and Stiglitz, 19714). The
original problem as formulated in sharecropping can be seen as follows:
Payment is cpnditional only on Q and by some fixed proportion so that
the worker receives yQ. Using (14) and (5), compensation of this sortimplies
that the worker's first-order condition is
C'(E) r y
so that the worker sets the marginal cost of effort equal to
'v'.But (5)
implies that the marginal value of effort is $1, which exceedsy so that the
worker puts forth too little effort. This is inefficient. Additionally, if
the farmer can obtain land without limit, he pushes his sharecroppingacreage
to the point where the next unit of land has zero marginalproduct. This is
clearly inefficient, but can be remedied if landowners can select share-
croppers and terms according to the amount of land each works. Both the owner
and worker could be made better off if the worker could be induced,by another
incentive contract, to produce where C'(E) 1.
Renting the land to the farmer and allowing the farmer to keep all of the
output accomplishes this. Under rental, the worker's compensation is
[Q —Rent].By (14) and (5), the worker is induced to set C'(E) r 1; the
marginal cost and marginal value of output are equated. Ofcourse, rental
does not solve all of the problems. Absent in the production function in (5)—7—
is that maintenance may be required. For example, if the farmer does not
fertilize the land, it maynotproduce as well in the future. A renter, who
can move on to the next plot after the soil is drained of minerals, has little
incentive to put resources into the land. Thus, the solution is to sell the
land to the farmer. Then the individual who works the land has the correct
incentives, either because he will continue to use it in the future or because
the sale price will reflect the quality of the land. But sale of the land
begs most of the questions. The sale may not come about because of the
farmer's capital constraints, because of his lack of entrepreneurial skill, or
because of his distaste for risk.2
The sharecropping paradigm applies to industrial production as well.
Profit sharing arrangements are, in many respects, like sharecropping. This
is especially true when there is only one worker. Partnerships are similar.
The same incentive problems arise. A worker who can quit and move on to
another firm without penalty does not have the sante desire to maintain the
equipment as the firm's owner. Again the solution is to sell the capital to
the worker, but this simply redefines the owner. Then there is no principal-
agent problem because there is no agent. This can be considered in more
detail in the next section.
B. Piece Rates
Piece rate compensation is not much different from sharecropping, the
latter being a special case of the former (see Stiglitz, 1g75). The owner
allows the worker (or farmer) to use his capital (or land) andpays the worker
according to some function of output. In the simplest scheme, a linear piece
2Note that risk is shifted fromowners to farmers even in sharecropping
and renting. Only labor contracts based exclusively on effort shift the risk
entirely to the owner.-8—
rate is used and the worker is paid rate R per unit Q so thatcompensation
is RQ. The worker's maximization problem (3) and (LI) implies that theworker
sets C'(E)R. The firm's zero profit constraint in (2) implies that Qr
RQ or that R r 1. Thus, the piece rate is efficient because the workersets
the marginal cost of effort equal to its marginal socialvalue, $1.
The issue is only slightly more complicated if capital is involved.A
linear piece rate with an intercept, i.e., compensationequal to A +RQ,
will do the job. This incentive contract achieves first—bestefficiency. The
worker's first—order condition, (U), still guarantees that he setsC'(E) r Fl.
The intercept drops out. But the zero profit constraintnow becomes:
Q -rentalcost of capital rA+RQ
The firm must "charge" the worker for the cost ofusing the capital, but how
should this be done? R can be reduced below 1 or Acan be set to a
negative number. The answer is that A-(Rental cost of capital) and
B1. Since (14) does not contain A, the worker does notrespond to changes
in A. However, reducing B below 1 causes the worker toreduce effort.
Thus, the efficient incentive contract, which also maximizes worker wealth
subject to the firm's zero profit constraint, requires that B1. Zero
profit requires that A r —(Rental cost of capital).
A major advantage to the use of piece rates asan incentive contract is
that it tolerates heterogeneity of worker ability. Moreable, i.e., lower
effort cost workers choose higher levels of effort, butare paid more. There
is no inefficiency involved in having workers of bothtypes in the firm. Of
course, if capital is important so that the worker is "charged" A for the
right to work on a machine, only workers above some thresholdability level
will choose to work. But workers self—sort. There isno need for the firm to—9—
doanything other than pay the efficient piece rate, in this case H r 1.
Linear piece rates are no longer appropriate incentive contracts if
workers are risk averse. In general, a nonlinear scheme will do better, but
will fail to achieve first—best solutions. As long as asymmetric information
exists, so that individual actions cannot be observed and contracted upon,
Pareto optimal risk sharing is precluded. (See Holmstrom, 1979 and Harris and
Raviv, 1979.)
C. Payment by Relative Output
The study of relative compensation has become increasingly important.
There are two approaches in this literature. The first, from Lazear and Rosen
(1981), characterizes the labor market as a tournament, where one worker is
pitted against another. The one with the highest level of output receives the
winning prize, i.e., the high—wage jab, while the other gets the losing prize,
i.e., the low—wage job. By increasing the spread between the winning and
losing prizes, incentives are provided to work hard. The optimum spread
induces workers to move to the point where the marginal cost of effortexactly
equals the marginal (social) return to it. The major advantages to payment by
tournament method are two: First, tournaments require only that relative
comparisons be made. It may be cheaper to observe that one worker produces
more than another than to determine the actual amount that each produces.
Second, compensation by rank "differences out" common noise. For example,
sales maybelow because the economy is in a slump, which has nothing to do
with worker effort. Risk aversion operates againstpenalizing or rewarding
workers for factors over which they have no control. But since theslump
affects both workers equally, relative comparisons are unaffected. Thebest
worker still produces more, even though both produce small amounts.-10-
Tournament—type incentive contracts induce workers to behave efficiently
if they are risk neutral. They are easy touse, but carry one major disad-
vantage. Workers increase the probability of winning, not only by doing well
themselves, but also by causing the opponent to do poorly. Thus, tournaments
discourage cooperation. This results in wage compression, which works to
discourage the aggressive behavior of workers who are competing for thesame
job (see Lazear, 1986). Other work in the area of tournament-type incentive
contracts includes Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), Green andStokey (1983), and
Carmichael (1983).
The second approach, from E{olmstrom (1982),suggests that if levels of
output can be observed, then payments can be based, at least inpart, on a
team average. As Holmstrom points out, a tournament isnot a sufficient
statistic so that using a team average allows the firm tobetter address risk
aversion. This incentive device also takes out common noise. Apeer average
picks up disturbances that are common to the industry and allows thefirm to
cater to the tastes of risk-averse workers.
Ill.Payment by Input
A. Observability of Effort
It is commonly alleged that payment of asalary or hourly wage does not
provide workers with the appropriate incentives. Whetheror not this is true
depends on the connection between the measurement of time andmeasurement of
effort. To see this, suppose that effort can be observedperfectly, but that
output cannot be observed at all. For example,suppose that it is easy to
measure the number of calories burned up by a workerduring his work day, but
it is impossible to separate hisoutput from that of his peers. Payment by
effort is a first—best incentive contract. Thecompensation scheme that pays-1 -
theworker $1 per unit of effort exerted induces him to set C'(E)1, which
as we have seen, is first best. Jote further that this is first best even for
risk-averse workers since compensation does not vary with random productivity
shocks,v (see Hall and Lilien, 1979).
The allegation that effort pay does not provide incentives is based on
the difference between hours of work and effort. If hours were a perfect
proxy for effort, then payment of an hourly wage would be an optimal incentive
contract. But because workers can vary work per hour, the connection breaks
down. Payment per hour provides appropriate incentives for choice of the
number of hours, but does not deal with what is done within the hour.
B. Payment by Effort and Worker Sorting
Piece rates induce workers to sort appropriately. Above, it wasargued
that workers who cannot produce a sufficiently high level of output will not
come to a firm that "charges" for use of capital. Salaries (or hourly wages)
that pay on the basis of an imperfect measure of effortencourage the lower-
quality workers to come to the firm. Lazear (1986a) demonstrates that a
separating equilibrium (see, e.g., Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976 and Salop and
Salop, 1976) exists where high—quality workers choose to work at firms that
pay piece rates and low-quality ones choose salaries. The difference in
quality across firms might lead one to conclude that movement to output—based
incentive contracts increases total output. In fact, the reversemay well be
true.In the same sense that screening in Spence (1973) issocially
unproductive, forcing salary firms to adopt piece rate incentive contracts
wastes resources on a potentially useless signal.
C. Incentive Contracts and Product Quality
Sometimes quantity is easier to observe than quality. Theproblem with-12-
incentive contracts that are based on output quantity is that they induce the
worker to go for speed and to ignore quality. If quality can be observed,
thenthe worker can be compensated appropriately for quantity and quality.
The appropriate compensation function is essentially the consumer's demand for
the product as it varies with quality and quantity. But ifquality cannot be
observed, payment by input "solves" the quantity/quality problem. If the
worker is paid, say, by hour, and merely instructed to producegoods of' a
given quality, he has no incentive to deviate from that instruction.Compen-
sation is based only on input so there is no desire to rush thejob. Of
course, this requires a method of monitoring effort cheaply. (See Lazear,
1986a for a full discussion of the tradeoffs.)
V. Other Issues in Incentive Contracting
A. Efficient Separation and Long—Term Investments
A properly structured incentive contract must induce the correctamount
of long—term investment. The problem is most clearlyseen in the context oC
specific human capital as in Becker (1962, 1975). Specific human capital iá
only valuable when the worker is employed at the current firm. Assuch,
workers are reluctant to invest in specific capital because the firmmay
capriciously fire the worker, in which case the investment is lost.
Similarly, firms are reluctant to invest because the workermay capriciously
quit. The incentive contract that Becker suggests is a sharing of investment
costs and returns by both workers and firms. (Hashimoto andlu, 1980 model
this more precisely.) Kennan (1979) points out thata particular kind of
severance pay solves the investment problem. It is akin to the liability
rules that are efficient in auto accident problems. Butas Hall and Lazear
(1984) argue, these rules mayactuallyinduce too much investment. Since a—13—
worker is compensated for the full investment whether work occurs ornot, he
has no incentive to account for situations that make aseparation optimal.
E.g., if it were optimal to sever the work relationship 25% of the time, the
worker should behave as if a specific investment that yields $1 returnonly
yields $.75.A full—reimbursement severance pay arrangement ensuresa full
$1, irrespective of the status of work, and induces too much investment.
More general issues of efficient separation arise in the labormarket
context and incentive contracts must be structured to deal with these
problems. Hall and Lazear (1984) consider a variety of different incentive
contracts and conclude that none generally achieves first best. Onethat come
close to doing so are is Vickrey (1961) bilateral auctionapproach. There,
compensation and work are separated so that the worker and firm have
incentives to reveal the true relevant values. Another scheme iscoordinated
severance pay, suggested by d'Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979).Sufficiently
high penalties on the firm associated with a worker's refusal towork induces
the firm to behave in a manner that isapparently first best.
B. Intertemporal Incentive Contracts
Sometimes, the fact that workers live for more than one period allows
ccntracts to be structured in a way that solves incentiveproblems. This is
the subject of Lazear (1979, 1981). The problem is thatas a worker
approaches the end of his career, he has an incentive to shirk becausethe
costs, even of being fired, are reduced as his retirement date drawsnear. A
way to discourage shirking is to tilt the age-earnings profile andcouple it
with a contingent pension. Young workersare paid less than their marginal
products; old workers are paid more. In equilibrium,shirking is discouraged
and workers receive exactly their lifetimemarginal products. The distortion
in the timing of the payments implies that workersdo not voluntarily choose_1Lk.
to work the correct number of hours. Thus, hoursconstraints are required, an
extreme form of which is mandatory retirement. Otherwork that has refined or
provided empirical support for that concept is Kuhn (1986)and Hutchens
(1986a, b).
There are other papers that focus on theintertemporal aspects of
incentive contracts. The first, Fama (1980)argues that the market provides a
discipline on workers. In a spot market, thewage that another firm is
willing to offer a worker next period depends on how well hedid last period.
Fama shows that this can act as a perfectincentive device, Of course, no
end—game problems are addressed by this mechanism, but itdoes demonstrate the
possibility of incentive provision even withoutexplicit or implicit
contracts. The second idea is attributable toRogerson (1985). The emphasis
here is on risk sharing, but the work hassome features in common with Fama
(1980). In particular, memory playsa strong role in these incentive
contracts, so that an outcome that affects the currentwage also affects the
future wage.
C.Intertempora]. Strategic Behavior by Firms
Once intertemporaj. contracts areconsidered, it is necessary to examine
the issue of opportunistic behavior
by firms. It may be that a firm does not
know a worker's cost of effort function,C(E). Actions that the worker takes
may reveal information about that function. The firmcan use that information
in subsequent periods against the worker.As a result, the worker attempts to
disguise C(E), leading to inefficiencies. Such isthe case for salesmen,
whose next period quota depends on thisperiod's performance. In Lazear
(1986a) it is shown that a properly structuredcontract in a competitive labor
market can undo the effects of this kind of'strategic behavior. This is a
specific example of the general theoremon revelation presented in Harris and—15—
Townsend (1981).It is also related to the literature on planned economies,
since bureaucrats tend to make things look worse than they are to lessen next
period's requirements or to increase next period's budget allocation (see,
e.g., Weitzman, 1976, 1980, and Fan, 1975).
D. Insurance
Finally, there is a closely related literature that examines insurance
contracts. That literature focuses, for the most part, on the tradeoff
between insurance and efficiency in the labor market. Some of the more
important papers in that literature include Harris and Holmstrom (1982),
Grossman and Hart (1983), and Green and Kahn (1983).
VI. Conclusion
Although incentive problems are pervasive, the market has found a number
of solutions. These involve payment by output of the piece rate or share-
cropping variety, payment by relative output exemplified by labor market
tournaments, payment by measured input, such as hours of work, and multi-
period incentive contracts. The contracts do not always achieve the first
best, especially when risk aversion is an issue. Still, the rich variety of
institutions that addresses incentive problems and the large amount of
literature devoted to study attests to the problem's importance in the labor
market context.—16—
REFERENCES
Becker, Gary S. "Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis,"
Journal of Political Economy 70 (October 1962): 9—49.
Becicer, Gary S. Human Capital: A Theoretical and EmpiricalAnalysis, with
Special Reference to Education, 2d ed., Columbia University Pressfor
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1975.
Becker, Gary S., and and Stigler, George J. "Law Enforcement,Malfeasance,
and Compensation of Enforcers," Journal of Legal Studies3 (January
1974): 1—18.
Calvo, G., and Wellisz, S. "Supervision, Loss of Control, andOptimum Size of
the Firm," Journal of Political Economy 86 (October 1978):943-52.
Carmichael, H. Lorne. "The Agent—Agents Problem; Paymenby Relative Output,"
Journal of Labor Economics 1 (January 1983): 50—65.
Cheung, Steven N. S., The Theory of Share Tenancy: With SpecialApplication to
Asian Agriculture and the First Phase of Taiwan LandReform. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1969.
d'Aspremont, Claude, and Gerard—Varet, Louis, André. "Incentivesand
Incomplete Information," Journal of Public Economics 11(February 1979): 25—45.
Fama,Eugene. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journalof
Political Economy (April 1980).
Fan,,L—S., "On the Reward System," American Economic Review 65(March 1975): 226-29.
Green, Jerry R. "On the Optimal Structure of LiabilityLaws," Bell Journal of
Economics 7 (Autumn 1976): 553—714,
Green, Jerry R., and Kahn, Charles. "Wage EmploymentContracts," Quarterly
Journal of Economics 98 (1983): 173—88.
Green, Jerry IL, and Stokey, Nancy L. "A Comparison of Tournamentsand
Contracts," Journal of Political Economy 91 (June 1983): 349—64.
Grossman, Sanford, and Hart, Oliver. "Implicit Contracts underAsymmetric
Information," Quarterly Journal of Economics 71 (1983): 123—57.
Hall, Robert E., and Lazear, Edward P. "The ExcessSensitivity of Layoffs and
Quits to Demand," Journal of Labor Economics 2 (April1981!): 233—57.
Hall, Robert E., and Lilien, David. "Efficient WageBargains Under Uncertain
Supply and Demand," American Economic Review 69 (December1979): 868—79.—17—
Harris, Milton, and Hälmstrom, Bengt. "A Theory of Wage Dynamics," Review of
Economic Studies 149 (July 1982): 315—33.
Harris, Milton, and Raviv, Artur. "Optimal Incentive Contracts with Imperfect
Information," J.E.T. 24 (1979).
Harris, Milton, and Townsend, Robert. "Resource Allocation under Asymmetric
Information," Econometrica 49 (January 1981): 33-64.
Hashimoto, Masanori, and Yu, Ben. "Specific Capital, Employment Contracts,
and Wage Rigidity," Bell Journal of Economics (Autumn 1980): 536—49.
Hölmstrom, Bengt. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics
10 (Spring 1979): 74—91.
Hölmstrom, Bengt. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics 13
(Autumn1982):324-40.
Hutchens, Robert. "Delayed Payment Contracts and a Firm's Propensity to Hire
Older Workers," forthcoming, Journal of Labor Economics, January
1986. (a)
Hutchens, Robert. "An Empirical Test of Lazear's Theory of Delayed Payment
Contracts," Working paper, Cornell University Institute for Labor and
Industrial Relations, 1986.(b)
Johnson, D. Gale. "Resource Allocation Under Share Contracts," Journal of
Political Economy 58 (1950): 111—23.
Kennan, John. "Bonding and the Enforcement of Labor Contracts," Economic
Letters 3 (1979): 61—66.
Kuhn, Peter J. "Wages, Effort, and Incentive Compatability in Life—Cycle
Employment Contracts," Journal of Labor Economics 4 (January 1986): 28—
49.
Lazear, Edward P. "WhyIsThere Mandatory Retirement?" Journal of Political
Economy 87 (December 1979): 1261—64.
Lazear, Edward P. "Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity and Hours
Restrictions," American Economic Review 71 (September 1981): 606-20.
Lazear, Edward P. "Pay Equality and Industrial Politics," Mimeographed.
University of Chicago, 1986.
Lazear, Edward P. "Salaries and Piece Rates," Journal of Business,
forthcoming, 1986.(a)
Lazear, Edward P., and Rosen, Sherwin. "Rank—Order Tournaments as Optimum
Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy 89 (1981): 841—64.
Mirrlees, James A. "The Optimal Structure of Incentives with Authority within
an Organization," Bell Journal of Economics 7 (Spring 1976): 105-31.-18-
Nalebuff, Barry J., and Stiglitz, Joseph E. "Prizes and Incentives: Towarda
General Theory of Compensation and Competition," Bell Journal of
Economics Ut (Spring 1983): 21—13.
Polinsky, A. Mitchell. "Strict Liability vs. Negligence in a Market Setting,"
American Economic Review (May 1980): 363—67.
Rogerson, William P. "Repeated Moral Hazard," Econometrica 53 (January 1985):
69—76.
Ross, Stephen A. "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem,"
American Economic Review 63 (May 1973): 134—39.
Rothschild, Michael, and Stiglitz, Joseph E. "Equilibrium in Competitive
Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of ImperfectInformation,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics 90 (November 1976): 529_J49•
Salop, Joanne, and Salop, Steven. "Self-Selection and Turnover in the Labor
Market," Quarterly Journal of Economics 90 (November 1976): 619-27.
Shavell, Stephen. "Strict Liability versus Negligence," Journal of Legal
Studies (January 1980): 1—25.
Spence, A. Michael. "Job Market Signalling," Quarterly Journal of Economics
87 (August 1973): 355—74.
Stiglitz, Joseph E. "Incentive and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping," Review of
Economic Studies 41 (April 1974): 219—56.
Stiglitz, Joseph E. "Incentives, Risk, and Information: Notes Towarda Theory
of Hierarchy," Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 6
(Autumn 1975): 552—79.
Vickrey, William. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed
Tenders," Journal of Finance 16 (1961): 1—17.
Weitzman, Martin. "The New Soviet Incentive Model," Bell Journal of Economics
(Spring 1976); 251—57.
Weitzman, Martin. "The 'Ratchet Principle' and Performance Incentives," Bell
Journal of Economics (Spring 1980): 302—08.